Rethinking Constitutional Interpretation through Joseph Raz’s Analytical Jurisprudence

Authors

  • Artha Debora Silalahi Faculty of Philosophy, Universitas Gadjah Mada
  • Rizal Mustansyir Faculty of Philosophy, Universitas Gadjah Mada
  • Sindung Tjahyadi Faculty of Philosophy, Universitas Gadjah Mada

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31078/consrev1118

Keywords:

Analytical Jurisprudence, Authority, Constitutional Interpretation, Joseph Raz, Rational and Moral Justification

Abstract

Joseph Raz’s analytical jurisprudence serves as a philosophical foundation for rethinking constitutional interpretation, particularly in the context of Indonesian legal discourse. Raz provides a rich theoretical framework that emphasizes the relationship between legal authority, moral legitimacy, and rational justification. He challenges the notion that legal authority is simply the power to command, arguing instead that it must be grounded in its ability to offer reasons that individuals have a good reason to follow reasons that are both morally and rationally justified. This perspective is especially important in constitutional adjudication, where courts are tasked with interpreting foundational legal texts in a way that balances fidelity to legal language with responsiveness to societal change. Raz maintains that legal texts cannot be understood in isolation rather, their meaning is shaped by the intentions of their drafters, the purposes they serve, and the broader cultural and historical context. His dialogical approach to interpretation urges judges to engage with law not just as static rules but as evolving instruments of justice. Methodologically, this research employs a philosophical and jurisprudential approach. The study proceeds by collecting and categorizing literature relevant to both the formal and material objects of the research. The formal object includes Raz’s core writings on legal and constitutional interpretation, as well as foundational works by other scholars who shaped his thought. The material object focuses on interpretive frameworks, constitutional reasoning, and the role of legal authority in discovering and reflecting constitutional interpretation. This method enables a critical examination of how Raz’s interpretive framework applies to Indonesia’s constitutional challenges, such as the tension between legal certainty and moral responsiveness. The study argues that Raz’s ideas offer a compelling alternative to rigid textualism by encouraging an approach that is normatively coherent, ethically responsible, and socially aware.

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Published

2025-05-31

How to Cite

Artha Debora Silalahi, Rizal Mustansyir, & Sindung Tjahyadi. (2025). Rethinking Constitutional Interpretation through Joseph Raz’s Analytical Jurisprudence. Constitutional Review, 11(1), 233–268. https://doi.org/10.31078/consrev1118

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