The Role of Constitutional Courts in Intergovernmental Conflict Resolution: the Argentine Case
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31078/consrev1111Keywords:
Constitutional theory, Institutional dialogue, Political safeguards, Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation of the Argentine RepublicAbstract
The constitutional and federal theory has debated about what are or what should be the safeguard mechanisms in modern federations, with two conflicting positions: the one that maintains that the mechanisms are essentially political (political safeguards), since the institutional design of the federal government is thought to guarantee an adequate representation of the subnational governments; while a second position holds that the judiciary, in general, and the supreme courts (or constitutional courts) in particular, are the bodies that stand as mechanisms tending to protect the federal system, based on the resolution of specific cases. This paper seeks to analyse what has been the position taken by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation of the Argentine Republic in the resolution of (vertical and horizontal) intergovernmental conflicts, in particular, due to the emergence of a new jurisprudence that has taken certain importance in the last decade; the paper concludes that the Argentine Court has opted for an intermediate position, where it is recognized itself as an actor with institutional capacity to resolve intergovernmental conflicts, identifying, providing content and making effective the general constitutional principle of federalism, but at the same time, highlighting the importance of political mechanisms for the resolution of such conflicts, orienting, guiding and even exhorting the constituent actors to resolve conflicts through institutional dialogue and negotiations.
References
Ábalos, María Gabriela. “Federalismo y autonomía municipal: la Corte Suprema reafirma su función arquitectónica en el desarrollo constitucional argentino [Federalism and Municipal Autonomy: The Supreme Court Reaffirms Its Architectural Function in Argentine Constitutional Development].” Suplemento de Derecho Constitucional, El Derecho (February 2015).
Ábalos, María Gabriela. Autonomía municipal, margen de apreciación local y libertad de comercio. Interpretación jurisprudencial en el diseño federal [Municipal Autonomy, Local Margin of Appreciation, and Freedom of Commerce: Jurisprudential Interpretation in Federal Design]. Santiago: Instituto de Estudios Constitucionales, 2021.
Ábalos, María Gabriela. “Lecciones de federalismo. Autonomía de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires y facultades concurrentes en la interpretación jurisprudencial [Lessons in Federalism: Autonomy of the City of Buenos Aires and Concurrent Powers in Jurisprudential Interpretation].” El Derecho – Constitucional 5 (May 2021): EDMCCCXLVII493.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. A Framework for Studying the Controversy Concerning the Federal Courts and Federalism. Information Report. Washington, DC: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1986.
Alexy, Robert. Teoría de los Derechos Fundamentales [Theory of Fundamental Rights]. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1993.
Altavilla, Cristian. “Conf licto y coordinación política en las relaciones intergubernamentales en Argentina: Un análisis neoinstitucional a través del régimen de coparticipación federal de impuestos [Conflict and Political Coordination in Intergovernmental Relations in Argentina: A Neoinstitutional Analysis through the Federal Tax RevenueSharing Regime].” PhD diss., Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, 2016.
Altavilla, Cristian. “Derecho intrafederal y los nuevos estándares en las relaciones fiscales intergubernamentales en el federalismo argentino: Un análisis a
años de la Reforma Constitucional de Nacional (1994–2019) [IntraFederal Law and New Standards in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Argentine Federalism: An Analysis 25 Years after the National Constitutional Reform (1994–2019)]”. Cuestiones Constitucionales: Revista Mexicana de Derecho Constitucional 43 (July–August 2020): 27–55.
Altavilla, Cristian. “El rol de provincias y municipios en el federalismo argentino en el contexto de la emergencia sanitaria [The Role of Provinces and Municipalities in Argentine Federalism in the Context of the Health Emergency].” In Derechos Fundamentales y Pospandemia: Experiencia y Desafíos de la Emergencia Sanitaria en Argentina, edited by Cristian Altavilla and Victorino Solá, 357–380. Buenos Aires: Olejnik, 2021.
Altavilla, Cristian. “El rol de la Corte Suprema en los conflictos intergubernamentales: Análisis del caso Prov. de La Pampa c/ Prov. de Mendoza [The Role of the Supreme Court in Intergovernmental Conflicts: Analysis of the Case Province of La Pampa v. Province of Mendoza].” Cuadernos de Federalismo 22 (2009): 119–149.
Altavilla, Cristian. Un dilema de la gobernabilidad en Argentina: el federalismo fiscal; perspectivas y propuestas [A Governance Dilemma in Argentina: Fiscal Federalism; Perspectives and Proposals]. Buenos Aires: Academia Nacional de Ciencias Morales y Políticas, 2019.
Altavilla, Cristian. “Un análisis de las relaciones intergubernamentales en el federalismo argentino a 200 años de su independencia (1816–2016) [An Analysis of Intergovernmental Relations in Argentine Federalism 200 Years after Independence (1816–2016)].” Studia Politicæ 45 (December 2018/2019): 117–153.
Anderson, George. Federalism: An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008
Baker, Lynn A. “Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism.” Villanova Law Review 46, no. 5 (2001): 951–974.
Baker, Lynn A., and Ernest A. Young. “Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review.” Duke Law Journal 51 (October 2001): 75–164.
Bednar, Jenna. The Robust Federation: Principles of Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Bednar, Jenna, and William N. Eskridge Jr. “Steadying the Court’s ‘Unsteady Path’: A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism.” Southern California Law Review 68 (1995): 1447–1491.
Benz, Arthur. “The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany: Guardian of Unitarism and Federalism.” In Courts in Federal Countries: Federalists or Unitarists?, edited by Nicholas Aroney and John Kincaid, 193–222. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017.
Bermann, George A. “Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States.” Columbia Law Review 94, no. 2 (March 1994): 331–366.
Burgess, Michael. In Search of the Federal Spirit: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives in Comparative Federalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Bußjäger, Peter. “Austria’s Cooperative Federalism.” In Austrian Federalism in Comparative Perspective, edited by Günter Bischof and Ferdinand Karlhofer, 11–33. Innsbruck: Innsbruck University Press, 2015.
Calabresi, Steven G., and Lucy D. Bickford. “Federalism and Subsidiarity: Perspectives from U.S. Constitutional Law.” Faculty Working Paper 215. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University School of Law, 2011.
Carpizo, Jorge. Federalismo en Latinoamérica [Federalism in Latin America]. Mexico City: UNAM – Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 1973.
Choper, Jesse H. Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
Choudhry, Sujit. “German Federalism in Translation: The German Grundgesetz’s Impact on South Africa’s 1996 Constitution.” In 70 Jahre Grundgesetz – Der deutsche Bundesstaat im Spiegel internationaler Erfahrungen, edited by Felix Knüpling et al., 229–246. Berlin: Springer, 2019.
Da Silva, Michael. “Federal Loyalty and the ‘Nature’ of Federalism.” Review of Constitutional Studies / Revue d’études constitutionnelles 24, no. 2 (July 2019–2020): 207–240.
De Vergottini, Giuseppe. Derecho Constitucional Comparado [Comparative Constitutional Law]. Mexico City: UNAM–Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 2004.
Delaney, Erin F. “Judicial Federalism in Comparative Perspective.” In Federalism and the Courts in Africa: Design and Impact in Comparative Perspective, edited by Yonatan Fessha and Karl Kössler, 15–28. London: Routledge, 2020.
Fernández Segado, Francisco. El Federalismo en América Latina [Federalism in Latin America]. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México / Corte de Constitucionalidad de Guatemala, 2003.
Fessha, Yonatan T., and Zemelak Ayele. “Giving ‘Shape and Texture’ to a Federal System? Ethiopia’s Courts and Its Unusual Umpire.” In Federalism and the Courts in Africa: Design and Impact in Comparative Perspective, edited by Yonatan Fessha and Karl Kössler, 47–67. London: Routledge, 2020.
Flynn, Brendan. “Reformed Subsidiarity in the Constitution for Europe: Can It Deliver on Expectations?” European Institute of Public Administration Working Paper 2005/W/07, 2005.
García Jaramillo, Leonardo. “Introducción [Introduction].” In Constitucionalismo democrático: Por una reconciliación entre Constitución y pueblo [Democratic Constitutionalism: Toward a Reconciliation between Constitution and People], by Robert Post and Reva Siegel, 11–29. Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2013. Gardbaum, Stephen. “Rethinking Constitutional Federalism.” Texas Law Review 74 (March 1996): 795–838.
Gargarella, Roberto. “Democracia e interpretación judicial de la Constitución [Democracy and Judicial Interpretation of the Constitution].” Espacio Abierto 17 (2012): 9–19.
Gargarella, Roberto. “Sagués, N. vs. Verbitsky, H., sobre sentencias exhortativas [Sagués, N. v. Verbitsky, H., on Advisory Judgments].” 2006.
https://www.cels.org.ar/common/documentos/gargarella_vs_sagues.pdf.
Gargarella, Roberto. “Un papel renovado para la Corte Suprema: Democracia e interpretación judicial de la Constitución [A Renewed Role for the Supreme Court: Democracy and Judicial Interpretation of the Constitution].” Gaceta Constitucional, special issue (September 2008): 573–590.
Gil Domínguez, Andrés. “Federalismo, municipios y libertad de comercio [Federalism, Municipalities, and Freedom of Commerce].” Rubinzal Culzoni RCD416/2021, 2021. https://rubinzalonline.com.ar/index.php/index/index/doctrinaOnline/2124769/.
Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. The Federalist Papers. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001.
Hernández, Antonio M. “Los sistemas políticos federales [Federal Political Systems].” In Derecho Público Provincial, edited by Antonio M. Hernández and Guillermo Barrera Buteler, 29–69. Buenos Aires: AbeledoPerrot, 2020.
Jackson, Vicki. “Subsidiarity, the Judicial Role, and the Warren Court’s Contribution to the Revival of State Government.” In Federalism and Subsidiarity, edited by James E. Fleming and Jacob T. Levy, 190–213. New York: New York University Press, 2014.
Keil, Soeren. “Federalism as a Tool of Conflict Resolution.” In A Research Agenda for Federalism Studies, edited by John Kincaid, 1–25. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019.
Kramer, Larry D. “Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism.” Columbia Law Review 100, no. 1 (January 2000): 215–293.
Lienhard, Andreas, et al. “The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland: Judicial Balancing of Federalism without Judicial Review.” In Courts in Federal Countries: Federalists or Unitarists?, edited by Nicholas Aroney and John Kincaid, 404–439. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017.
Lijphart, Arend. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in ThirtySix Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999.
Loewenstein, Karl. Teoría de la Constitución [Theory of the Constitution]. Barcelona; Caracas; Mexico City: Ariel, 1986.
Lyons, Daniel A. “The Lesson of Lopez: The Political Dynamics of Federalism’s Political Safeguards.” Harvard Law Review 119, no. 2 (December 2005): 609–630.
Mastromarino, Anna. “El laboratorio belga: ¿reforma constitucional o acción constituyente? [The Belgian Laboratory: Constitutional Reform or Constituent Action?].” In Parlamento, ciudadanos y entes territoriales ante la reforma constitucional: Quién y cómo participa? [Parliament, citizens, and territorial entities in the face of constitutional reform: Who participates, and how?], edited by J. M. Castellà Andreu, 201–220. Barcelona: Tirant Lo Blanch, 2018.
Post, Robert, and Reva Siegel. Constitucionalismo democrático: Por una reconciliación entre Constitución y pueblo [Democratic Constitutionalism: Toward a Reconciliation between Constitution and People]. Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2013.
Prakash, Saikrishna B., and John C. Yoo. “The Puzzling Persistence of ProcessBased Federalism Theories.” Texas Law Review 79 (November 2001): 1–73. Raeimon Nato, Jan. “Development of Duties of Federal Loyalty: Lessons Learned, Conversations to Be Had.” Baxter Family Competition on Federalism, 2019.
Rasson, Anne-Catherine. “Le principe du vivre ensemble belge : une épopée constitutionnelle [The Principle of Belgian ‘Living Together’: A Constitutional Epic].” CPDK 1 (2012): 25–75.
Schnabel, Johanna. Gestión de interdependencias en sistemas federales: consejos intergubernamentales y creación de políticas públicas [Managing Interdependencies in Federal Systems: Intergovernmental Councils and Public Policy Making]. Toluca, Estado de México: Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México, 2022.
Schwabe, Jürgen. Jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional Federal Alemán: Extractos de las sentencias más relevantes [Case Law of the German Federal Constitutional Court: Extracts from the Most Relevant Judgments]. Mexico City: Fundación Konrad Adenauer A.C., Oficina México, 2009.
Stefanovic, Andrej. “Role of the Judiciary in Shaping Federations: Cases of the Supreme Court in the United States and the Court of Justice in the European Union.” Journal of Liberty and International Affairs 3, suppl. 1 (July 2017).
Steytler, Nico. “The Constitutional Court of South Africa: Reinforcing an Hourglass System of MultiLevel Government.” In Courts in Federal Countries: Federalists or Unitarists?, edited by Nicholas Aroney and John Kincaid, 328–359. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017.
Torres Buteler, Eduardo J. “Algunas curiosidades de un fallo que maximiza la competencia municipal [Some Curiosities of a Ruling That Maximizes Municipal Competence].” Revista Facultad de Derecho 5 (November 2021): 260–264.
Tushnet, Mark. “Revisión judicial dialógica [Dialogic Judicial Review].” In Por una justicia dialógica, edited by Roberto Gargarella, 105–116. Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2014.
Tushnet, Mark. Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
Vela Ávalos, Marcos Antonio. “Dialogic Justice in a Constitutional Engineering Resistant to Dialogic Constitutionalism: The Case of El Salvador.” Anuario Iberoamericano de Justicia Constitucional 26, no. 1 (June 2022): 181–211.
Watts, Ronald. “Models of Federal Power Sharing.” International Social Science Journal 53, no. 167 (March 2001): 23–32.
Woelk, Jens. “Loyal Cooperation: Systemic Principle of Italy’s Regionalism?” In Federalism and Constitutional Law: The Italian Contribution to Comparative Regionalism, edited by Erika Arban, Giuseppe Martinico, and Francesco Palermo, 171–188. London: Routledge, 2021.
Wright, Deil S. Understanding Intergovernmental Relations. 3rd ed. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1988.
Yoo, John C. “The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism.” Southern California Law Review 70 (July 1996): 1314–1406.
